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TAXATION OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
IN THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
JAMES F. QUEENAN, JR. *
I. INTRODUCTION
When a business is sold and the seller has been active in its man-
agement, the buyer usually insists that the seller give a covenant not
to compete for a specified period. There are sound business reasons
for the buyer to protect himself from such competition. In addition,
not far from his (or his lawyer's) mind is the pleasant thought that
such a covenant might provide an opportunity to recoup at least a
portion of the purchase price by means of a tax deduction. In order
to realize this expected tax benefit, he will seek to have the contract
allocate a specific portion of the purchase price to the covenant with
the intention of amortizing this amount over its term. The seller, al-
though willing to grant the covenant, may well object to any sum
being allocated to it on the ground that this will bring ordinary in-
come to him as opposed to the capital gain treatment which could
otherwise be obtained. Often the parties take it for granted that there
is a well settled rule of law that a covenant not to compete
brings a tax deduction through amortization to the buyer and
ordinary income to the seller. It is the purpose of this article to deter-
mine in the first instance the extent to which the case law supports
this view of the covenant's tax consequences and, secondly, to attempt
an analysis of the question. Before dealing with these tax questions,
however, it may be helpful at this point to review the common law in-
cidents of covenants not to compete.
Seller's Right to Compete
In the absence of a restrictive covenant, the seller may thereafter
engage in a competing business and solicit his former customers by
indirect means such as public advertising.' Nor is he prohibited from
disclosing his prior relationship with the business provided this is not
done in such a manner as to convey the impression that his new busi-
ness is but a continuation of the old.' He may not, however, resort to
private solicitation of his former customers for this is regarded as rend-
ering the entire sale a fraud upon the purchaser.3 The buyer may
* B.S., B.A. 1953, T.L.B. 1958, Boston College; Member, Massachusetts and Federal
Bars; Associate in the firm of Sibley, Blair & Mountain, Worcester, Mass.
1 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 12 (1943); 24 Am. Jur. Goodwill § 18 (1939). See Annota-
tion, 82 A.L.R. 1030 (1933).
2 White v. Trowbridge, 216 Pa. 11, 64 Atl. 862 (1906); Getter v. Levine, 315 Mich.
353, 24 N.W.2d 149 (1946).
3 Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App, 2d 389, 288 P.2d 623 (1955); LaGrange v. Datsis,
142 Me. 48, 46 A.2d 408 (1946); Colton v. Duvall, 254 Mich. 346, 237 N.W. 48 (1931);
267
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
enjoin him from dealing with customers obtained by such activity
even though they may well have eventually traded with him on their
own initiative.' A few courts have found a distinction between the
sale of a professional practice and the sale of a commercial business,
holding that in the former the goodwill sold is too closely linked to the
personal qualities of the seller to permit his subsequent competition.5
Also, in Massachusetts, as opposed to the prevailing opinion elsewhere,
the expressed or implied transfer of goodwill imposes upon the seller
an obligation to refrain from any competition, whether through private
or public solicitation, which is in derogation of the transfer.°
This considerable freedom of action which is permitted the seller
by most courts is apparently the result of a belief that the right to
compete is too basic to be proscribed by implication. Since the courts
would have no particular difficulty in establishing a restriction upon
the seller appropriately limited in time and area,' the merit of the
rule permitting competition in the absence of a covenant is question-
able. The seller's subsequent competition could be disastrous to the
business because he can often retain a substantial number of his
customers by simply going into business again without the necessity of
resorting to private solicitation. A covenant not to compete does, there-
fore, give the buyer significant protection.
When given in connection with the sale of a business and not
unduly extended in time and area, the covenant is valid as a reason-
able means of protecting the business.' If its term or the geographical
area encompassed is such that the buyer has more protection than is
necessary for this purpose, the covenant may be rewritten by the
court in order to avoid an unreasonable restraint upon competition.°
A covenant granted in connection with the sale of a business or ancil-
lary to some other valid transaction is to be contrasted with the so-
called "naked" covenant between competitors which is totally void
as an unreasonable restraint upon competition."
Gibbons v. Hansch, 185 Minn. 290, 240 N.W. 901  (1932). See Annotation, 82 A.L.R.
1030.
4 Synder Pasteurized Milk Co. v. Burton, 80 N.J. Eq. 185, 83 ALL 907 (1912).
5 See, e.g., Brown v. Benninger, 118 Md. 29, 84 All. 79 (1912) ; Yeakley v. Gaston,
50 Tex. Civ. App. 405, 10 S.W. 768 (1908).
6 Lynn Tucker Sales, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 323 Mass. 721, 84 N.E.2d 127 (1948) ; Auslyn,
Inc. v. Rousseau, 321 Mass. 735, 75 N.E.2d 641 (1947) ; Old Corner Book Store v. Upham,
194 Mass. 101, 80 N.E. 228 (1907). Compare Martin v, Jablonski, 253 Mass. 451, 149
N.E. 156 (1925).
7 See the Massachusetts cases cited supra note 6.
8 5 Williston, Contracts § 1641 (rev. ed. 1937).
0 Restatement, Contracts, § 518 (1932), would permit the covenant to be rewritten
only if the valid and invalid aspects are grammatically divisible. The present tendency
seems to be away from this emphasis upon form. See 5 Williston, Contracts § 1660 (rev.
ed. 1937).
10 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed, 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd
sub nom., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See 5 Williston, Contracts § 1636 (rev. ed. 1937). Standard
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H. TAX CONSEQUENCES: TREATMENT BY THE COURTS
A. The Problem
A business usually has a value which exceeds the total value of
its tangible property. Part of this excess value may be attributed to
a depreciable intangible such as a patent, but the remainder is called
"goodwill." As shall be more fully discussed later,' the tax con-
sequences to both buyer and seller from the sale of goodwill are clear:
The buyer is not allowed a deduction for depreciation and because
of goodwill's non-depreciable nature, the seller is entitled to capital
gain treatment. Lawyers representing buyers are thus constantly
attempting to minimize the amount that is attributed to the residual
excess value. The only method which has met with any degree of
success, other than inflating the value of depreciable property where
there is a sale of assets rather than stock, consists of allocating a
portion of the price to a covenant not to compete.
Perhaps no other subject in our tax law can surpass the covenant
in ambivalence of treatment by the courts. The difficulty is caused
by its relationship with goodwill. Goodwill is generally regarded as a
species of intangible business property which is an improper subject
of depreciation or amortization due to its indeterminate life. A cove-
nant not to compete, on the other hand, is a personal obligation of the
covenantor requiring him to refrain from competition for only a
specified period. Should it be treated differently from goodwill or are
they nonseverable?
B. Theory of Nonseverability
The theory of nonseverability has as its origin the decision in
Toledo Newspaper Co.' 2 The petitioner had entered into an agreement
with the Toledo Blade Company, which published a rival paper,
whereby it sold to the latter the exclusive right to use the name of its
newspaper, the Toledo News-Bee, together with all circulation, route,
subscription, dealer and carrier lists, syndicated features and wire
service rights. No tangible assets, such as machinery and equipment,
were included in the sale. The contract set the price for the trans-
fer at $100,000. In addition, the petitioner covenanted not to compete
in the City of Toledo for a period of ten years in considera-
tion of the payment of $780,000. The buyer expressly agreed in the
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 796 (1958), is ap-
parently the only tax case in which the question of voidness, illegality or even public
policy has been raised. The court noted that the Commissioner cited "no authority for
his contention that the deduction would not be allowable if the agreement could not he
enforced." Moreover, it stated that the tax deduction for amortization does not depend
upon state laws.
See Section III. A., infra.
12 2 T.C. 794 (1943).
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written contract to share with the seller fifty per cent of the expected
tax savings resulting from amortization of the covenant. The Tax
Court ruled that the $780,000 should be treated by the seller as part of
the purchase price rather than ordinary income, reasoning that the
covenant's purpose was to protect the value of the goodwill transferred
and thus it should not be segregated from the transfer of assets.
The tax consequences to the buyer of the Toledo News-Bee were
litigated several years later in Toledo Blade Co." The court reaffirmed
its position that the covenant was not divisible from the remainder of
the transaction and denied to the buyer the right to amortize the price
of the covenant. Judge Murdock, dissenting, pointed out that several
previous decisions of the court" supported seperate tax treatment for
the covenant. He admitted that perhaps other provisions of the con-
tract (presumably the agreement to share the expected tax savings)
might lead to the conclusion that the cost of the covenant was less
that $780,000, but was dissatisfied with the decision in that he believed
it was incumbent upon the court to determine a proper allocation. As
one writer" has pointed out, the Tax Court in the Toledo newspaper
decision may well have been influenced by factors other than the
theory of nonseverability. After having transferred the name of its
newspaper, together with circulation and subscription lists, syndicated
features and wire service rights, it would seem that the seller would
not be in a position to compete even if it was free to do so. This plus
the agreement to share expected tax savings indicate that the alloca-
tion of so large a portion of the total consideration to the covenant was
highly unrealistic. However, the court did not base its decision on this
ground.
An attempt at reconciling the Toledo News-Bee cases with prior
decisions was made in Aaron Michaels" where the court formulated
the following statement of the theory of nonseverability which has
been adopted in many other cases:
If such an agreement can be segregated, not so much for
the purposes of valuation as in order to be assured that a
separate item has actually been dealt with, the agreement is
ordinary income and not the sale of a capital asset. . . . But
where it accompanies the transfer of goodwill in the sale of a
going business and it is apparent that the covenant not to
compete has the function primarily of assuring to the pur-
13 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 340
U.S. 811 (1950).
14 News Leader Co., 18 B.T.A. 1212 (1930); Christensen Mach. Co., 18 B.T.A. 256
(1929) ; William Ziegler, Jr., 1 E.T.A. 186 (1924).
15 Barrett, Covenants Not To Compete: Their Effects Upon the Covenantor and
Covenantee, 18 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 861 (1960).
16 12 T.C. 17 (1949).
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chaser the beneficial enjoyment of the goodwill which he has
acquired, the covenant is regarded as nonseverable and as
being in effect a contributing element of the assets trans-
ferred.i
Joseph Faulkner' 8
 illustrates the theory's application to a trans-
action involving a typical use of the covenant not to compete. The
petitioner's business was renting clothing such as aprons and dental
gowns. At the time of the sale he enjoyed an acquaintance of many
years standing with his customers. The price assigned to the assets of
the business was $13,867.80 with $3,000 allocated to goodwill and
an additional $10,000 paid for the seller's covenant not to compete.
In view of the fact that the volume of the business seemed to be based
chiefly on the personal relationship between the individual proprietor
and his customers, the proportionate allocation between goodwill and
the covenant appears to have been reasonable. Finding that the pri-
mary function of the covenant was clearly to protect goodwill, the
court ruled that it was nonseverable from goodwill so that the con-
sideration paid for it was a portion of the sale proceeds to be taxed
to the seller at capital gain rates rather than as ordinary income.
C. Covenant Accorded Separate Treatment
A concise statement of the view allowing amortization by the
buyer is found in Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co.:"
. . . in a transaction in which property is sold and the seller
covenants to not engage in business in competition with the
purchaser for a specified period of time, if the parties in good
faith and realistically treat the covenant in a separate and
severable manner in respect to value and cost the purchaser
may amortize the price paid for the covenant and claim an-
nual deductions pro rata during the life of the covenant.'
Courts which have permitted the buyer to amortize take the posi-
tion that the right to be free from the seller's competition is a separate
asset. Because of its limited life, the reasoning goes, amortization
should be allowed on the same principle permitting a deduction for the
exhaustion, wear and tear of other property used in a trade or busi-
ness.2 ' In an early Board of Tax Appeals decision' which falls within
this category, the Commissioner argued that the buyer might so
strengthen his position by the end of the covenant's term as to be
37 Id. at 19.
1 8 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 175 (1956).
10 209 F,2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
20 Id. at 928.
21 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., supra note 20.
22 Christensen Mach. Co., supra note 14.
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unaffected by the seller's competition for one or more years thereafter.
The Board conceded this as a possibility, but nevertheless believed the
covenant to have essentially a limited life and concluded that amortiza-
tion based upon the stated term was reasonable.
Under this theory the covenant is regarded as being capable of
coexisting with that potpourri of expectancies and advantages called
goodwill without either losing its essentially independent nature."
The Tax Court decision in United Fin. & Thrift Corp. of Tulsa" is
perhaps the clearest illustration. The petitioners, subsidiaries of a
parent finance company, each purchased the assets of a branch office
operated by a competitor. Both of these newly acquired branch offices
were located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. A covenant not to compete within
fifteen miles of Tulsa for a specified period of time was obtained from
the sellers in both transactions. The entire excess of the purchase price
over the book value of the accounts and notes assigned was allocated
to the covenant. In one purchase, $181,803 was paid for the ac-
counts and notes and $23,397 for the covenant; in the other,
$26,125.54 was paid for the accounts and notes and $4,750 for the
covenant. The Commissioner, armed with the Toledo newspaper cases
and the line of cases" following them, refused to allow amortization of
the covenant. At the trial, evidence was introduced indicating that the
typical customer in the field renews or refinances his outstanding loan
approximately 2.6 times and on the average remains on the books of
the loan company as a borrower for 27 to 30 months. The court found
that the likelihood of obtaining this repeat business represented a
valuable intangible asset, the acquisition of which was not reflected
by assigning to the covenant the entire excess of the purchase price
over book value. It concluded, nevertheless, that some portion of the
excess should be allocated to the covenant for two reasons: (1) it
removed the sellers from the field of competition for future customers
and (2) although the sellers would be prohibited from soliciting the
customers whose obligations were assigned even in the absence of the
covenant, nevertheless the covenant gave the buyers much greater
assurance that during the periods specified the sellers could not in
any other way attract their former customers. The court allocated to
the covenant not to compete $11,579.80 out of the total of $23,397
23 See, e.g., J. W. Rogers v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961); Williamson
& Waite, Inc. v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9163 (S.D. Ind. 1961) ; Daukch v.
Busey, 125 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Ohio 1954); Max Levine, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 363
(1962); United Fin. & Thrift Corp. of Tulsa, 31 T.C. 278 (1958), aff'd, 282 F.2d 919
(4th Cir. 1960), cert. den., 366 U.S. 902 (1961).
24 Supra note 23.
Aaron Michaels, supra note 16; Lee Ruwitch, 22 T.C. 1053 (1954); Lloyd H.
Walker, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 558 (1954) ; Harold J. Burke, 18 T.C. 77 (1954) ;
& H Begal Bakery, Inc., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1955); Joseph Faulkner, supra
note 18; S. Alper, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1414 (1956); Masquelette's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1957).
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in the first transaction and $3,051.84 out of the total of $4,750 in
the second, and permitted amortization during their respective terms.
There is a sidelight to this decision which may interest students
of stare decisis. In finding the existence of a potential for retaining
customers, the court employed the phrase "valuable intangible asset"
rather than that catch-all and garden-variety term "goodwill." This
was apparently due to the fact that the theory holding the covenant
and goodwill to be nonseverable has been particularly prevalent in Tax
Court decisions. The Great Bard's verse on the rose would seem to
have application here. Another technique, resorted to in one decision"
of the Tax Court, consists of rendering lip service to the theory of non-
severability and then, under the guise of fact finding, holding the cove-
nant to be severable.
The corollary to allowing the buyer to deduct the price of the
covenant through amortization is charging the seller with the receipt
of ordinary income.27
 The consideration paid for the covenant is
treated as income from forebearing, rather than performing, personal
services.' The courts which so hold reject the contention that the
covenant is given by the seller as an integral part of the sale so that
it should be treated as essentially capital in nature. In their view this
would amount to holding that the seller has conveyed his individual
privilege to refrain from engaging in business which, of course, is an
impossibility. They regard the covenant as merely a promise which is
no more of a conveyance than any other promise between contracting
parties."
HI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVENANT AND GOODWILL
A. Goodwill
For many years there has been a regulation" in effect containing
the broad proposition that goodwill is not depreciable and this rule
is well established in our tax law. Its basis stems from the decision in
Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co." and its companion
case, Renziehausen v. Lucas." The taxpayers had attempted to amor-
tize and deduct the value of goodwill over the period remaining before
the effective date of the eighteenth amendment establishing prohibi-
25 Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
27
 Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954); Beal's Estate
v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112
(2d Cir. 1935), aff'd on other grounds, 297 U.S. 106 (1936) ; Cox v. Helvering, 71 F.2d
987 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Richard Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957), aff'd, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.
1959).
28 See, e.g., Cox v. Helvering, supra note 27.
28
 Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 27.
2° Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
31 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
32 Id. at 387.
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tion. The Supreme Court denied the deduction, but based its decision
upon a policy judgment that a tax benefit should not accrue to a busi-
ness by reason of it becoming illegal. As has been pointed out by
Judge Learned Hand," this reasoning has rather limited application.
Nonetheless, these two cases are generally regarded as authority for
denying depreciation or amortization of goodwill.' The present vital-
ity of the rule, however, is due to the difficulty which is inherent in
ascertaining the life of goodwill." The effect upon the seller of the
unavailability of a depreciation allowance is that goodwill is then by
definition a capital asset and he is entitled to report its sale accord-
ingly."
As has been seen, lawyers representing the buyer of a business
have on many an occasion convinced a court that a covenant not to
compete is something distinct from goodwill so that the price paid for
it should not bring about the same tax consequences. Semantics has
certainly aided the buyer on this question. Undeniably the covenant
and goodwill are not identical, but the real question is: What is its
relationship with goodwill? The concept embodied by the word "good-
will" is such a broad one that problems can be created when we depend
upon a single word to express it. Perhaps the best known definition
is that of Justice Story:
Goodwill may be properly enough described to be the
advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment
beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds, or property
employed therein, in consequence of the general public pa-
tronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or
habitual customers on account of its local position, or com-
mon celebrity, or reputation for skill, or influence, or punc-
tuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities,
or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.".
Although the word is commonly used in reference to the advan-
tageous relationship that a business enjoys with its customers, and
shall be so used here, it does include advantageous relationships with
suppliers, financiers, employees and many others having a relationship
with it." The extent of the mileage realized from it, even when de-
scribing only advantageous customer relations, becomes apparent when
33 Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
34 McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 Va. L. Rev. 645 (1959).
35 Dodge Bros. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95 (4th Cir, 1941); X-Pando Corp., 7
T.C. 48 (1946).
30 Int. Rev, Code of 1954, § 1221.
37 Storey, Partnerships § 99 (7th ed. 1881).
38 Commons, Industrial Goodwill, 18-26 (1919) ; Grace Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner,
173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949).
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we consider that the intended benefit may be due to a trademark in
one business, with location being of no importance, whereas in another,
location may be the principal factor. No attempt will be made
here to present a comprehensive discussion of the concept in the
abstract. Since our purpose concerns itself with the role of the cove-
nant in the transfer of goodwill, the approach shall be orientated upon
the intent of the parties and the economic facts which precipitate their
bargain. The comment of Judge Cardozo is particularly appropriate
in this connection: "Men will pay for any privilege that gives a reason-
able expectancy of a preference in the race of competition.'
B. Function of the Covenant
The transfer of those advantageous relations and expectancies
which depend upon factors having no direct connection with an indi-
vidual active in the business poses no problem for the buyer. Factors
such as a location, customer list, and trademark or trade name, which
may be called non-personal elements of goodwill, are specific items
of property whose ownership and enjoyment can be passed to the
buyer by traditional methods. But often there is an individual, whether
he be a stockholder, proprietor or partner, who must be taken into
account because a significant aspect of the favorable customer attitude
seems to be centered upon him personally. Depending to a great extent
upon the nature of the business, this personal predilection on the part
of customers or clients may vary from a pleasant business acquaint-
anceship to a deep admiration and respect for the individual's ability
arising out of a close working relationship. It may also be based upon
such non-business factors as personal friendship or the individual's
general prominence in the area as a result of civic activity. The per-
sonal element of goodwill often cannot be isolated from other elements.
Thus, one customer may be doing business with the enterprise not
only because he is favorably disposed toward the person with whom
he has direct dealings but also because he has a high regard
for the general quality of the company's services or products. The
continued patronage of another may be as much a matter of habit
as it is his favorable disposition toward an individual.
In these circumstances it becomes obvious to the buyer that he
must do something more than merely obtain the non-personal elements
which contribute to the goodwill. What he does, of course, is to exact
a covenant not to compete from the individual in question. Otherwise,
assuming an ability to compete, a substantial number of customers
may well be diverted to the seller if he were to go into business again.
It is, therefore, a combingtion of two methods which transfers the
goodwill of the business: (1) the buyer is furnished with the symbols
'' In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926).
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which have evoked a favorable response on the part of customers and
(2) the seller is eliminated as an alternative attraction.°
The term of the covenant is set in accordance with the buyer's
estimate of the length of time necessary to be free from the seller's
competition before the business will have a sufficiently solid relation-
ship with its customers as to be unaffected thereafter by the seller
re-entering the field. Any term which is reasonably designed to attain
this end is valid." Although the period of the covenants in reported
cases is usually substantially less than ten years, a longer term will
be approved where the court believes this length of time is necessary
to secure the goodwill of the purchased business." The seller is hardly
in a position to object to a covenant with any term which bears a
logical relation to the transfer of the goodwill he desires to sell. Ob-
jection on the part of the seller is seldom a problem in any event. He
is usually selling because he intends, at least at the time, to go out
of the business entirely or leave the area.
The buyer intends to obtain as nearly the equivalent goodwill
as was enjoyed by the seller. It may be necessary for him there-
after to devote a good deal of time and effort and incur substantial ex-
penses in order to maintain the goodwill. This does not destroy the
fact that he is the recipient of a concrete business advantage. Even
with such activity, he cannot expect to secure the patronage of all the
customers. But neither would the seller be so sanguine as to think
that he could have retained them all. The parties are dealing with an
expectancy and nothing more. If it is apparent that some customers
will not do business with the successor, then an adjustment in the price
might be made.
It is unrealistic to think of the seller as hovering in the back-
ground ready to commence ruinous competition upon expiration of
the covenant's term. At that point he will have been out of the field
too long and the advantage which he previously possessed will be
firmly anchored with his former business. 43
 Every transaction involv-
ing a covenant not to compete illustrates this principle of human ob-
solescence.
It is true that in addition to securing the goodwill of the business
the covenant also eliminates the seller's competition with respect to
future customers. This aspect of the covenant is much like a naked
covenant between competitors, particularly where the purchase repre-
sents an expansion of the buyer's present business, and it can be
logically separated from the transfer of goodwill. If this function of
4° See Malcolm J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203 (1960); Note, An Inquiry into the Nature
of Goodwill, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 660 (1953).
41 Williston, supra note 8.
42 See, e.g., Bonneau v. Meaney, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1465, 178 N.E.2d 577 (1961)
43 See Chamberlain, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 69 (3d ed. 1938).
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the covenant is of importance to the buyer so that a portion of the
purchase price may be treated as having been paid for it, then, to the
extent of this value, the covenant should be subject to amortization
and should bring ordinary income to the seller. Moreover, it is possible
to imagine a transaction in which the pure elimination of competition
is an important element in the total price paid. This would be so if
the seller's competition had been hurting the buyer in his present
business so that he felt it necessary to make the purchase as a matter
of self-preservation. But this is not the typical transaction. Certainly
in most instances the buyer wants the covenant only as an aid in
obtaining the goodwill presently enjoyed by the seller. The entire price
reflects this intention leaving no value to be affixed elsewhere. The
decision in United Fin. & Thrift Corp. of Tulsa,' which allowed
amortization, was based in part upon the covenant's function of re-
moving the sellers from the field of competition for potential customers.
Since the court's findings of fact do not indicate that elimination of
formidable competition was a motive of the buyer in making the pur-
chase, the court's reliance upon this function of the covenant appears
to be erroneous.
The covenant does, therefore, operate as a means of transferring
goodwill. Granted, the covenant of itself is not a conveyance. But
goodwill is a unique concept. Although it has some of the attributes
of property, such as being a proper subject of legal protection, it cannot
be adequately treated in property terms. Its transfer in particular
should be analyzed by concentrating upon the factual reality of what
the parties intended and did rather than upon legal theory. Amortiza-
tion of the covenant should not be allowed because, although it has a
limited life, the expiration of its term brings about no event which
affects the business. The only event which did affect the business
transpired when the covenant was granted and an expectancy with
an indeterminate life passed to the buyer. The covenant is somewhat
similar to a license for the operation of a television station or liquor
store. Because such licenses are readily renewable by the holder, the
initial cost of obtaining them, as opposed to the nominal periodic fees
charged by the issuer, is deemed to be paid for an asset with an in-
definite life which is not the subject of a depreciation allowance.°
C. Supplementary Means of Transferring "Personal" Goodwill
The personal element of goodwill may be of such significance that
the extraction of a covenant not to compete from the seller coupled
with the transfer of any pertinent non-personal factors would not give
the buyer anywhere near the goodwill enjoyed by the seller. This is
44 Supra note 23.
95 KWTX Broadcasting Co., 31 T.C. 952 ,(1959), afrd, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.
1959); Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951).
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likely to be the case where the business has been founded and operated
by one man and deals in personal services. Here, all or substantially
all of the goodwill arises from the individual seller. He, in reality, is the
goodwill. How can goodwill of this nature be transferred in any per-
manent sense to the buyer?
The Commissioner's answer is that it cannot. Revenue Ruling
6O-301" states:
... if a business is dependent solely upon the personal char-
acteristics and competence of the owner, no element of good-
will exists with respect thereto and no portion of the sales
price of the business may be treated as proceeds from the
sale of goodwill, irrespective of whether or not such sale com-
prehends a valid assignment of the right to the exclusive use
of the firm name.
The Commissioner regards the sale of this type of business as an
assignment of future earnings and taxes the proceeds (except those
from any tangible property), including whatever may be allocated to
the covenant, as ordinary income.
This position has been rejected by the courts' and the decision
in Richard S. Wyler" demonstrates the fallacy of its reasoning. The
petitioner was an accountant who had been in practice under the name
of Richard S. Wyler & Company for twenty-four years prior to the
sale. He had no partners and employed five accountants. Most of his
clients had been with him a number of years and he enjoyed an excel-
lent reputation, particularly in the lumber industry. He decided to
"take life easier" and, at the age of sixty, entered into negotiations
for the sale of his practice to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., a firm
of accountants with offices throughout the country.
The buyer was clearly confronted with the problem of securing
goodwill of a highly personalized nature. Obtaining Wyler's working
papers and placing a partner in charge of the staff would certainly
not be sufficient. It was, after all, Wyler who was the symbol which
had invoked a favorable response from clients. The method selected
was one which had been used by the buyer in previous purchases.
Wyler became one of its partners for a term of slightly less than three
and one-half years. He also agreed not to compete within three states
for a period of three years thereafter. No separate price was allocated
to the covenant. Wyler was to handle the business of his former clients
48 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 16.
47 masquellette's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 25; Rees v. United States,
187 F. Supp. 924 (D.C. Ore: 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Estate of L.
Melnik, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 .(1961) ; Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961) ;
Malcolm J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203 (1960) ; Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950) ;
Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
48 Supra note 47.
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with the proviso that all his appointments, business and correspond-
ence were to be in the name of the partnership which was to bill:for
and collect the fees. The contract required him to use his best efforts to
hold his clients as clients of the buyer. At the time the contract was
executed, Wyler received $50,000 which was expressly designated as
being paid for goodwill. His compensation during his short term as
partner was a combination of straight salary and profit sharing with
a specified adjustment downward in the last year if the total gross
income from his former clients was less than anticipated. Shortly
after the contract was signed, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company,
with Wyler as a new partner, took over Wyler's working papers, files
and all of his staff and continued in the same suite of offices until more
space was available where it maintained its local office. For several
years, the name of Richard S. Wyler & Co. was displayed on the
office door and listed in the telephone book under the buyer's number.
The entire transaction was obviously a well thought out plan
designated to dilute the goodwill previously centered upon Wyler
alone. The buyer could have simply required Wyler to inform his
clients of the sale, have him recommend that they allow the buyer to
act as their accountant, and obtain a covenant not to compete for a
term commencing at the time of the sale. The partners handling ne-
gotiations for Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. may well have rejected
this technique as forming too transitory a nexus between their firm
and Wyler. The practice of Wyler was such that a gradual transition
process was appropriate with Wyler in the interim doing everything
possible to establish a favorable relationship between the buyer and
his clients. Partners and employees of the buyer could then play an
increasing role in dealing with his clients by at first sitting in on con-
ferences, then gradually establishing a direct working relationship in
conjunction with Wyler, and finally completely taking over the ac-
counts. Assuming no particular problems with respect to relative
abilities and personalities, the process is not a difficult one. Binding
Wyler to this arrangement, coupled with eliminating him as a com-
petitor for a period thereafter, assured the transfer of goodwill at the
time the contract was executed. Records of the buyer established the
transfer as a reality by the time the case was tried. The court had
no difficulty in rejecting the Commissioner's argument and holding that
goodwill had, in fact, been transferred.
IV. CRITIQUE or NONSEVERABILITY THEORY
The theory of nonseverability, as stated by the courts, is in sub-
stance this: The covenant has a separate tax consequence if the parties
treat it separately, but if its function is to assure to the buyer the
enjoyment of goodwill, then the covenant is nonseverable from
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goodwill. The theory does recognize the covenant as related to the
transfer of goodwill. But this manner of expressing the relationship
as an exception or alternative to a general rule of severability is most
misleading. As has been seen, the exception all but swallows the rule.
This has led to some rather strange results.
A. Existence of Goodwill
Several decisions" have accorded separate tax treatment to a
covenant not to compete on the strength of questionable findings that
the business transferred did not have goodwill. If such a finding is
made, the "exception" to the theory of nonseverability then poses no
problem.
Betty W. Crissey" involved the sale of an insurance agency by its
two partners. The buyers insisted at the outset that the contract in-
clude a covenant not to compete in order to protect renewals on exist-
ing policies. A price of $60,000 was agreed upon, and on the advice
of an accountant, the final contract contained an allocation to the
covenants. A total of $55,000 was allocated to the sellers' six-year
covenants and $5,000 to furniture, fixtures and supplies. The buyers
claimed an annual deduction of $9,165, or one-sixth of the cove-
nant's price. Renewals had been running rather poorly prior to the
sale and the agency was operated at a loss for the first few years
thereafter. Because of this history, the Tax Court ruled that goodwill
was not transferred and allowed amortization of the covenant. This
reasoning is opposed to the traditional concept of goodwill which does
not require any minimum degree of profit.' There is nothing incon-
sistent with a business having advantageous relations and yet operating
at a loss because of any number of unrelated factors such as inefficient
management. The degree of profit is of importance in the accountant's
definition of goodwill" which is properly governed by conservative
principles tending to understate values. It should play no role in a
tax law that can only be effective when based upon existing facts and
the parties' intent. Since the buyers in the Crissey case were primarily
interested in obtaining renewals, undoubtedly the sale included so-
called "expirations." These are records as to policies previously sold,
including the name of the insured, type of insurance, expiration date
and so forth. This information enables the buyer to contact an insured
before the present policy expires and places him in a position to
readily obtain a renewal. It is an intangible asset in the nature of
49 See, e.g., Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th
Cir. 1955) ; Betty W. Crissey, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 947 (1961) ; Frances Silberman,
22 T.C. 1240 (1954).
5° Supra note 49.
11 See Note, supra note 40.
52 Id. at 681.
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goodwill." The actual facts of the case, therefore, present the typical
situation of a buyer obtaining an expectancy of a preference through
the transfer of specific assets in conjunction with the seller's covenant
not to compete.
In Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,' the plain-
tiff had been purchasing athletic shoes from another manufacturer and
selling them under its own label. It bought out the other manufacturer
and received a ten-year covenant not to compete from the selling
company rather than any individual in it. Although the contract con-
tained no allocation, the buyer recorded $142,692.30 as the cost of
the covenant and $10,000 as the cost of goodwill. In view of the
previous dealings between the parties, the court accepted the buyer's
testimony that it was not interested in the customers of the seller. It
found that little or no value should be placed upon goodwill in the
transaction and allowed amortization of the price that the buyer had
assigned to the covenant. This decision seems to be another instance
of a court applying an incorrect concept of goodwill. It restricted the
concept to advantageous customer relations whereas in all probability
some form of industrial goodwill (perhaps advantageous employee
relations) had been included in the sale.
B. Covenants of Stockholders and Employees
Courts which have adopted the theory of nonseverability find a
distinction between a stockholder's covenant not to compete and a
covenant granted by a proprietor or partner. Where the business is
in corporate form, the corporation is regarded as the owner of the
goodwill, not its stockholders. 3' The covenant of the stockholders in
a stock sale is thus considered severable from the goodwill." The
result is the same where the sale is cast in the form of an asset deal with
the stockholders receiving the proceeds in liquidation." This reasoning
exalts form over substance. In these transactions the stockholder's
interest in the business, including the goodwill, is being sold and he
receives the proceeds. His covenant aids in the transfer of that good-
will in precisely the same manner as does the covenant of a proprietor
or partner. There is no essential difference between the two situations."
53 George J. Aitken, 35 T.C. 227 (1960).
54 Supra note 49.
5G
	
Hamlin v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954), where the court
held that the covenant was not ancillary to the sale because the sellers sold stock and
not a going business.
50 Anthony Rock, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 46 (1962); Howard G. Mathews, 20
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1565 (1961); Richard Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957), aff'd on other
grounds, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
57 Sec Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Cox v. Helvering,
71 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
59' In Tobin v. Cody, 1962. Mass. Adv. Sh. 339, 180 N.E.2d 652 (1962), the Massa-
chusetts court rejected the distinction and extended its rule prohibiting competition by
the seller to a sale of stock.
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A more difficult problem is presented when the sale is accom-
panied by a covenant not to compete on the part of an employee who
owns no interest in the business. Since the employee purports to be
selling nothing, at first blush his covenant would appear to be sever-
able from the goodwill transferred and thus bring him ordinary in-
come. The function of the covenant, however, is the same: the transfer
of goodwill. The tax consequences to the buyer are clear because he
is the recipient of the goodwill. But what of the employee? Should he
be considered a co-vendor with the owner or would it be more ap-
propriate to treat him as receiving compensation for forbearing from
the performance of services? Here again, the essential capital nature
of the transaction should prevail. The price paid to the employee
should be treated as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset with a
zero basis. If the owner of the business, or the corporation, receives
the covenant's consideration and passes it on to the employee, the
result should be the same even though this resembles severance pay.
An analysis of the question based upon a view of goodwill as just
another item of property owned by the business would, of course, lead
to a different conclusion.
V. COVENANTS WITHOUT VALUE
Covenants not to compete have frequently been inserted into a
sales contract for tax reasons only. The buyer, either through his
own strong bargaining position or the seller's ignorance of the pos-
sible tax consequences, may be successful in assigning a specific con-
sideration to the covenant where a much lower price or no allocation
at all would more nearly express the realities of the situation. The
courts have been quick to recognize these sham transactions.
In Ray H. Schulz,' the parties to the agreement, who were part-
ners, assigned $18,000 to the seller's covenant not to compete. It
was brought out in evidence that the seller was leaving the business
in order to enter a noncompetitive field. Furthermore, he did not
have the engineering background or sales contacts to compete and
could not have possibly obtained the necessary equipment before the
expiration of the covenant's term. The court had no difficulty in con-
cluding that the only significance of the covenant was as an attempted
tax deduction. In reply to the contention that the covenant was im-
portant to the business as a protection of its pool of labor and customer
accounts, the court stated that even if this were so, the covenant would
nevertheless be nonseverable from these elements of goodwill. Radio
Medford, Inc. v. United States" involved the purchase of a radio sta-
tion from a widow who was of retirement age and not likely to go into
59 34 T.C. 235 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961).
60 150 F. Supp. 641 (D.C. Ore. 1957).
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business again. The purchaser unsuccessfully sought to have a sum
assigned to the covenant in the written contract. He later attempted
to amortize an amount which he alleged was paid for the covenant,
but the court held that no value should be affixed to it.
The negotiations which formed the background in Harry Swartz"
present an interesting example of the manner in which the supposed
tax benefits of the covenant can be a factor in the total price paid.
The petitioners entered into negotiations for the sale of the assets of
their three closely held corporations to Food Fair Stores, Inc., the
operator of an expanding chain of supermarkets. They eventually
asked $750,000 for the assets exclusive of inventory and the buyer
remained firm at an offer of $600,000. The representatives of Food
Fair later stated they were willing to pay $700,000 but would have
to insert a covenant not to compete in order to give them a tax benefit.
This was the first time a restrictive covenant had been mentioned by
any of the parties. The petitioners replied they did not intend to
compete and had no objection to the covenant, but insisted that the
price be raised to $750,000. Negotiations resumed and they split
the difference at $725,000 with $110,000 being allocated to the
covenant. The court ruled that the covenant did not bring ordinary
income to the petitioners because (1) having been inserted at the
final stage of negotiations for tax reasons only, it was not bargained
for and (2) the petitioners had no intention of competing and, in fact,
could not have competed with the new owners.
It will he recalled that the courts which are disposed toward
viewing the covenant as something separate from goodwill require that
the parties, in the language of the Gazette Tel. Co. case,' "in good
faith and realistically treat the covenant in a separate and severable
manner." The problem of the covenant's relationship with goodwill
aside, there should be no difficulty with the requisite of good faith and
realistic treatment. If the seller is able to compete, taking into account
such factors as his health, age and general capabilities, the insertion of
the covenant in the contract certainly would be realistic and done in
good faith. This would be so even though he has no present intention
of competing. The buyer wants an enforceable right in this regard and
is willing to pay for it.
The meaning of the phrase "separate' and severable manner" is
not as clear. Although courts have been willing to make an allocation
of their own when convinced that the covenant was a meaningful
element in the transaction," this language may be interpreted to
61 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1276 (1960).
02 Supra note 20.
63 See, e.g., Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 49; Wil-
liamson & Waite, Inc., supra note 23; B. T. Babbitt, 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935); Rodney B.
Horton, supra note 26.
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require that the parties allocate a price to the covenant in the written
contract. Certaintly without doing this the buyer is rather hard put to
prove that he paid anything for the covenant itself." If the contract
does make an allocation, is it also necessary for the parties to put a
price tag on the covenant throughout their negotiations? The Gazette
Tel. Co. line of cases has never required this and it would be most
unrealistic to do so. Buyer and seller quite naturally view the business
as an entity. Counsel representing the buyer and thus hopeful of a tax
benefit should, however, advise his client to mention the covenant at
the outset of the negotiations and see that a record is made of this
in contemporaneous notes and communications. The amount which the
contract allocates to the covenant is presumptively correct and strong
proof would have to be introduced to overcome this evidence of its
price.'Counsel representing the seller should, of course, resist any
allocation. It would also be helpful to the seller if the contract con-
tained a separate provision dealing with both goodwill and the cove-
nant, with a statement that the covenant is intended only as an aid in
the transfer of goodwill."
VI. CONCLUSION
The present uncertainty in the taxation of covenants not to com-
pete adds a complication to a transaction which often is already suffi-
ciently complex. A good deal of the confusion is no doubt caused by
the continued use of the term "goodwill" without recognition of the
tremendously broad concept that it denotes. Certainly the covenant's
role as merely an aid in the transfer of goodwill needs to be more
fully recognized so that the only question remaining concerns itself
with the tax consequences of the purchase and sale of goodwill. The
case for depreciating goodwill has been argued elsewhere." The
subject should be explored without false premises concerning cove-
nants not to compete.
64 See, e.g., Fox & Hounds, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1216 (1962) ; Radio Med-
ford, Inc. v. 'United States, supra note 59.
(15 Commissioner v. Ullman, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Roy H. Schulz,
supra note 59.
" In George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954), the fact that the transfer of goodwill
and the covenant were treated in one sentence was of aid to the seller.
67 McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 Va. L. Rev. 645 (1959).
Mr. McDonald believes it should make no difference that goodwill is purchased rather
than gradually developed and contends that goodwill does have a limited life, albeit one
not susceptible of exact computation. He advocates separating capitalized goodwill into
component parts and amortizing the values assigned to the various elements. For example,
if a trained labor force contributes toward the goodwill of a business, then its value
would be deducted through amortization over the period that the seller would have
required to hire and train an equivalent force. Perhaps the answer lies in legislation
allowing amortization over an arbitrary period as is permissible for research and ex-
perimental expenditures and trademark and trade name expenditures. Sec Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, §§ 174(b) & 177.
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